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ABSTRACT 
The effect of integrating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) systems into today’s 
battlespace is promoting concepts of precision engagement by enhancing our information 
advantage.  This thesis explores the new paradigm evolving around UAV technology that 
has enabled UAV systems to become a central node for accelerated sensor-to-shooter 
capabilities involved with precision engagement by accelerating the integration of 
communications, command, control, computers intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) systems with recent innovations in time-critical targeting.  The increased 
information advantage and precision engagement strategies recently demonstrated in 
Operation Enduring Freedom have catalyzed further UAV system integration and 
highlighted the synergistic effects.  Future technological advancements associated with 
UAV systems will allow new capabilities to evolve that increase our real-time 
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The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) envisions the creation of a 
future joint force capable of demonstrating the operational concepts presented in Joint 
Vision 2020: America’s Military, Preparing for Tomorrow.  The goal of Joint Vision 
2020 (JV2020) is to empower the joint force of tomorrow with the capabilities required to 
achieve full spectrum dominance, enabling the joint force to be persuasive in peace, 
decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.  Achieving full spectrum 
dominance requires the integration of four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, 
precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.  JV2020 
explains full spectrum dominance as the ability to operate unilaterally or in combination 
with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any 
situation across the full range of military operations (“Joint Vision”, 2000, p. 6).  The 
interdependent application of the four operational concepts mentioned above allows the 
future joint force to achieve full spectrum dominance. 
A. JV2020 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 
The operational concept of focused logistics means providing the joint force with 
the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and the 
right quantity.  Dominant maneuver refers to the ability of the joint force to gain 
positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo.  Full 
dimensional protection defines the ability of a joint force to protect its personnel and 
other assets when decisively executing assigned tasks.  The fourth operational concept, 
precision engagement, is the focal point of this research.  Precision engagement is the 
ability of a joint force to locate, surveil, distinguish, and track objectives or targets; 
select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and 
reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, 
throughout the full range of military operations (“Joint Vision”, 2000, p. 20-26).  Of the 
four concepts supporting full spectrum dominance, precision engagement is the one 
increasing in importance due to its relevance to combating the current proliferation of 
asymmetric threats.  The main characteristic of precision engagement is the linking of the 
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necessary sensors with the appropriate delivery systems to create a desired effect.  
Precision engagement’s key enabler is the ability to analyze the enemy by achieving 
information superiority, which then permits us to identify and strike at the enemy’s 
critical information nodes.  Information superiority is the capability to collect, process, 
and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an 
adversary’s ability to do the same (p. 8).  The difficulty in gaining information superiority 
over asymmetric threats lies in the ability to identify the critical information nodes, which 
are unlikely to be similar to our own.  To gain an informational advantage over an 
asymmetric threat, we must identify the information needs of the enemy, and then attack 
those needs using our advanced information capabilities (Alberts, Garstka, Hayes, & 
Signori, 2001, p. 55).  The element of surprise made possible through achieving 
information superiority will often be the prerequisite for success in combating 
asymmetric threats and the side capable of creating and maintaining an informational 
advantage will be most likely be capable of achieving surprise (p. 54). 
1. Enabling Effects of Information Superiority 
Technological advances in computers, electronics, and sensors are rapidly making 
precision engagement possible.  These areas of technological advance support the 
collecting and processing of information that gives us information superiority.  The 
commander utilizes information superiority to evaluate the situation, calculate the desired 
level of effect, select the appropriate forces and course of action (COA), accurately 
access the results of the actions taken, and then reengage the enemy as necessary (“Joint 
Vision”, 2000, p. 22).  Achieving information superiority implies a state or condition that 
provides an informational imbalance in one’s favor.  This imbalance can be used to 
prevent damage to our own forces through the age-old principle of achieving surprise, or 
by creating effective deception strategies.  Current information systems supporting the 
battlespace are being networked together, creating a robust ability to support information 
superiority.  Maintaining the information advantage is accomplished by effectively 
integrating the information systems supporting information operations.  Information 
technology has increased the tools necessary to integrate information systems across a 
global network.  Current advances with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) systems are connecting the information systems necessary to provide access to 
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precise and timely information across the battlespace.  Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
have slowly demonstrated an increasing ability to provide this precise and timely 
information.  Increased use of precision-guided munitions is creating a proportional 
demand on the level of precise information required in the battlespace.  Only 10 percent 
of weapons used in Operation Desert Storm were precision weapons.  This rose 
dramatically to 90 percent with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan 
(Israel, 2002, p. 1).  Precise information enables precision-guided weapons to engage 
difficult targets, and the increasing ability to deliver this precise information in real-time 
has rapidly improved their effectiveness.  Technological advances in UAV’s are rapidly 
fulfilling the need for precise real-time information capabilities available through 
improved imagery, radar, and communications.  This study examines the effects that 
advancing UAV technology is having on precision engagement. 
B. THE EFECTS OF ADVANCED UAV TECHNOLOGY 
The current technological advances in UAVs have increased real-time ISR 
capabilities over the battlespace, and making tremendous changes in how we engage the 
enemy.  Advanced UAV technology has steadily increased the quantity and quality of 
real-time ISR that directly benefits precision engagement.  The improved real-time 
capabilities of UAVs are changing from what was once purely an ISR mission into 
supporting precision engagement with improved precision strike capabilities.  Advanced 
UAV technology has expanded the real-time data links necessary to link information 
networks shared by command, control, communications, other ISR assets, and now 
directly with weapon systems.  This expanding network has begun to provide us with 
heightened abilities that promote the information superiority necessary for precision 
engagement. 
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As a result of effectively increasing our access to information over the 
battlespace, advanced UAV real-time capabilities have sped up the flow of information 
along the sensor-to-shooter loop.  The sensor-to-shooter loop is initiated by a sensor 
observing a target, then converting the data collected into precise targeting information as 
close to real-time as possible, communicating the information across a network of 
systems; and finally executing the desired effect.  The increased real-time access to ISR 
information is providing enhancements in targeting data that has closed the gap between 
the sensor and shooter.  Precision engagement pursues this rapid decision capability by 
exploiting the real-time informational advantage representative of improved UAV 
technological advancements.  UAV’s have helped bring about this rapid decision 
capability by integrating the real-time ISR information necessary to exploit the 
information advantage and support precision engagement. 
1. The Human Element on the Ground 
The presence of friendly forces on the ground enhances the information advantage 
by providing the ground truth necessary to validate the situational awareness held by 
command elements.  Ground truth is a common buzzword used to describe the actual 
situation on the ground compared to the situation perceived by rear echelon commanders.  
The additional situational awareness gained from integrating the human element on the 
ground into the sensor-to-shooter loop has a positive impact by validating and increasing 
the informational advantage.  The presence of well-trained Special Operations Forces on 
the ground represents a critical link that can assist in the direction or execution of specific 
precision engagement goals.  The increased situational awareness received by combining 
the ground truth relayed by a human sensor on the ground with the persistent ISR 
capabilities of UAVs makes dramatic improvements to precision engagement concepts. 
C. UAV EVOLUTION FROM KOSOVO TO AFGHANISTAN 
4 
Two case studies will be analyzed for the operational trends and expanding 
missions of UAV systems.  The first case study examines UAV operations in Kosovo 
(Operation Allied Force), and analyzes the numerous innovations that evolved with UAV 
employment in that conflict.  The second case study will cover recent operations in 
Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) that uniquely demonstrated how UAVs 
promote precision engagement.  Each case study will examine UAV vulnerabilities and 
limitations that still represent challenges to UAV integration.  The case study of 
Operation Allied Force offers a comprehensive look at how the evolution of UAV 
technology has influenced the innovative use of ISR platforms, expanding them into 
areas of real-time ISR, time-critical targeting, and instantaneous battle damage 
assessments (BDA).  The absence of ground forces during OAF provides an interesting 
contrast to Afghanistan, where the effective use of Special Forces on the ground 
enhanced the integration of UAV systems.  Through a comparison of the two case 
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II. KOSOVO UAV EMPLOYMENT 
Planners were aided by one of the most successful innovations of 
the air campaign.  For the first time, we used the Predator UAV in a 
targeting role.  Before Allied Force, the Predator could transmit targeting 
imagery to its operator on the ground as part of the intelligence collection 
network.  During the air campaign, we reviewed Predator video in real-
time and immediately provided pilots with the locations of mobile Serb 
targets.  Toward the end of the war, we equipped the Predator with a laser 
so that it could place a beam on a target – this identified it so a loitering 
strike aircraft could destroy it.  We were able to successfully employ the 
Predator with a laser only once before Allied Force ended, but in doing so, 
we developed a capability with great potential for rapid targeting.  General 
John P. Jumper, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff (Cordesman, 2001, p. 353) 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
When NATO forces publicly discounted the use of ground troops to repel Serb 
forces from Kosovo it resulted in the active pursuit of an air war strategy.  A strategic air 
campaign was the NATO military response to the Kosovo crisis in the hopes of avoiding 
the casualties involved with an extensive ground campaign.  The use of UAVs eliminated 
the risks of casualties associated with other modes of manned reconnaissance and 
surveillance or with the risks of placing Special Forces on the ground.  By setting the 
surface ceiling for manned flight at 15,000 feet above ground level (AGL), NATO forces 
avoided threat engagements, and created a necessary use for UAVs.  One of the first U.S. 
controlled UAV systems deployed was the Hunter RQ-5 tactical UAV, which has a 
service ceiling of 15,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) and therefore made the system 
uniquely qualified to operate within the airspace restrictions defined by the air campaign.  
Operation Allied Force (OAF) created many different missions for UAVs thereby 
establishing UAV’s as a critical asset.  As a result, NATO encountered many challenges 
for integrating UAV systems during the operation, such as air tasking order (ATO) 
integration, airspace deconfliction with manned aircraft, and integration with civilian 
traffic at forward operating bases.  Allied UAV’s deployed by other NATO countries 
included French, German, and British systems.  This case study will show how for the 
7 
first time in combat UAVs were used to improve the decision superiority of NATO 
Allied forces and promoted innovative precision engagement strategies.  Initial access to 
real-time ISR capabilities demonstrated the importance of pursuing capabilities that 
improved the information advantage of the commanders controlling the striking force. 
This chapter will evaluate the mission of UAVs during Operation Allied Force 
(OAF) and the many lessons learned that resulted from their integration into combat 
operations.  Exploring these lessons for potential future technological capabilities and or 
relevant limitations will contribute to our understanding of how to improve the effects of 
integrating UAV systems into precision engagement strategies.  The survivability of 
UAVs in combat was one of the hardest lessons learned after the start of the war.  Allied 
forces lost an estimated 21 UAV’s to enemy actions, mechanical failures, or operator 
error.  As many as 15 of these losses belonged to US forces and stirred a growing concern 
for the survivability of UAV’s in future combat (Ripley, 1999, p. 6).  In the next chapter, 
we will see how these lessons learned enhanced combat operations in Afghanistan, and 
further analyze how advances in technology are steadily improving UAV system 
integration. 
B. UAV MISSION IS EXPANDED IN KOSOVO 
The deployment of UAVs to support the Kosovo air campaign represented the 
largest deployment of UAV’s since the Gulf War.  The primary mission of UAV’s during 
the Gulf War was to provide surveillance and reconnaissance, but the uses for UAVs 
expanded past surveillance during OAF to include target verification, battle damage 
assessments (BDA), time-critical targeting, signal intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery 
intelligence (IMINT) activities, as well as assisting in uncovering evidence of Serb 
atrocities (Ripley, 1999, pp. 1-3).  Many NATO allied countries deployed UAV systems 
to support the war effort, but only a few US systems were capable of actively integrating 
real-time imagery into other systems. 
US forces deployed the Army’s Hunter tactical UAV, the Navy’s Pioneer UAV, 
and the Air Force’s Predator medium altitude endurance UAV to support OAF.  British 
forces deployed the Phoenix UAV to support Harrier operations, and the French and 
German forces deployed CL-289 drones to support BDA and targeting operations.  The 
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French also deployed the Crecerelle drone for surveillance purposes.  The Hunter and the 
Predator UAV systems were the only UAVs initially capable of sending real-time or near 
real-time imagery to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) located in Italy.  The 
absence of NATO ground troops in Kosovo changed the role of the Hunter and Phoenix 
tactical UAVs to one of providing ISR capabilities to air assets versus supporting the 
ground forces that they were originally designed to support.  These tactical UAVs helped 
provide the battlespace awareness sought after by NATO to strike targets deep within the 
battlespace.  UAV importance increased due to the combination of persistent poor 
weather associated with the mountainous terrain that often hampered other means of ISR.  
The limitations on manned flights below 15,000’ AGL also became a major factor in 
actively promoting the dull (surveillance and reconnaissance missions), or dangerous 
(high surface-to-air threat environments) missions, mitigating the risks to manned 
aircraft. 
Through a performance analysis of the Hunter and Predator UAV during OAF, 
we can reveal some evidence of how the integration of UAVs into the battlespace have 
advanced the JV2020 concepts of precision engagement, along with improving our ability 
to achieve information superiority.  NATO commanders slowly utilized the technological 
advances in UAV sensors, communications, along with new capabilities in targeting 
during OAF.  The possibility for future improvements in UAV missions has expanded as 
a direct result of the lessons learned in Kosovo, and highlights the synergistic effects 
capable through UAV systems. 
1. Hunter UAV Employment 
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The Hunter UAV serves the US Army as a tactical UAV supporting ground forces 
through targeting and reconnaissance missions.  Task Force (TF) Hunter’s mission in 
Kosovo evolved into supporting the strategic air campaign.  As a result, TF Hunter had to 
adjust its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to meet this tasking.  The main 
mission of TF Hunter was to provide IMINT and target verification to support air strikes.  
The Hunter flew over 240 missions and over 1,300 flight hours in support of this effort 
(Nascimento, 2000, p. 1).  TF Hunter deployed to Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia in 
March of 1999, and operated under an Army Corps Military Intelligence Brigade.  The 
CAOC had operational control (OPCON) of TF Hunter in order to provide the imagery 
on targets and direct air strikes.  The secondary mission that TF Hunter accomplished 
was the support of the TF Hawk mission in Albania.  TF Hawk consisted of the AH-64 
Apache helicopters and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) deployed for deep 
strikes into Kosovo.  The development of the hunter-killer relationship between the two 
systems increased the survivability of the Apache and spurred the desire to hunt high 
payoff targets including tanks, APC’s, artillery, and air defense facilities.  UAV missions 
in Kosovo were the first to stimulate the need for weaponizing UAVs through the initial 
steps of placing laser target designators on Predator and Hunter UAVs. 
a. Mission and Operations 
TF Hunter had the primary responsibility of supporting Joint Task Force 
Noble Anvil (JTF-NA) with real-time imagery intelligence (IMINT) that soon became 
critical to the air campaign.  The mission to support JTF-NA also represented a first time 
deployment of an Army UAV Company to support contingency operations.  Connectivity 
between the CAOC and TF Hunter became a vital concern for providing direct support to 
the air campaign with real-time intelligence.  The use of the Joint Broadcasting System 
(JBS) provided the CAOC with UAV imagery and helped immensely with integrating TF 
Hunter’s mission into OAF actions.  This innovation facilitated the integration of TF 
Hunter’s ability to work closely with the CAOC and resolved the dissemination of real-
time IMINT collection on targets used to direct air strikes.  Operational control of TF 
Hunter went to TF Hawk when the AH-64 Apaches and the MLRS deployed to Albania.  
The support of the TF Hawk mission consisted of searching and validating enemy targets 
listed on a High Payoff Target List (HPTL).  TF Hunter supported operations of the 
Apache within their engagement area.  The main objective was to locate targets for the 
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) along ingress and egress routes, and locate 
enemy defense positions, and border posts.  (Nascimento, 2000, p. 3) 
10 
TF Hunter had to overcome many challenges to mission execution that 
included becoming proficient in dual UAV relay missions, disseminating intelligence to 
the users, and incorporating an increased awareness for risk management.  The distances 
that TF Hunter had to extend UAV operations dictated that they fly two UAVs 
simultaneously to extend the communications range necessary to operate the UAV over 
mountainous terrain.  Control of the UAV over great distances relies on a line-of-sight 
system that often requires a relay by another UAV to complete the link.  This requirement 
demanded increased training and proficiency by the air vehicle operators (AVOs) and 
doubled the flight time on UAVs to accomplish one mission.  Personnel shortfalls 
perpetuated the problems of sustaining the UAV relay mission.  Training missions in 
UAV relay operations prior to OAF were also very limited due to CONUS airspace 
constraints, creating the need for accelerated proficiency training at Camp Able Sentry.  
(Nascimento, 2000, pp. 9-10) 
Disseminating intelligence information and imagery gathered by TF 
Hunter became a significant challenge upon initial deployment.  The standard method of 
using the Remote Video Terminal designed to support tactical operations was limited to 
only 40 nautical miles and therefore was not sufficient to support the CAOC 
requirements.  The alternative system recommended for this situation was the Trojan 
Spirit II system, but this system had limited access, and did not support the imagery 
resolution called upon to direct air strikes.  To meet the requirement, TF Hunter gained 
access to the Joint Broadcasting System (JBS).  The access was accomplished by 
providing live video feed via a Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) up-link to the 
CAOC.  JBS was capable of providing wide dissemination of real-time video to an 
extensive audience that promoted real-time battlespace awareness.  The list of feeds 
included the CAOC in Italy, TF Hawk in Albania, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 
Headquarters in Macedonia, TF Sabre Headquarters in Macedonia, the Theater Military 
Intelligence in Germany, the intelligence analysis Center in England, and Pentagon 
officials (Nascimento, 2000, p. 10).  Another benefit of the JBS was the secure 
encryption provided to the video feeds without degrading the required imagery resolution 
for the analysts.  This capability to broadcast real-time imagery to a broad audience 
enabled TF Hunter to integrate their system into a process evolving around advanced 
capabilities in time critical targeting, instantaneous BDA, rapid target analysis, and target 
verification.  These capabilities demonstrated in OAF were some of the first combat uses 
promoting precision engagement strategies. 
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Managing the risk to UAVs in the combat environment of Kosovo 
presented a specific challenge to all UAV support personnel.  Even though designed with 
a tactical use in mind, the Hunter UAV could not incorporate needed aircraft survivability 
equipment (ASE).  Hunter UAV survivability relies on varying the ingress and egress 
flight paths, the relative size, and quietness of the UAV, and maximizing the standoff 
distance as much as possible to decrease detection.  The Hunter UAV frequently loitered 
over and around targets for surveillance in Kosovo, thus providing the enemy more time 
to detect and engage the UAV.  TF Hunter countered this threat by loitering over targets 
for only short durations and then later revisiting the target from another direction.  The 
CAOC then provided TF Hunter with four entry points along the Macedonian-Kosovar 
border to hinder the detection by Serb forces (Nascimento, 2000, p. 11).  This allowed for 
an ability to vary ingress and egress routes and helped to avoid predictability when flying 
over enemy positions.  The remaining limitations and vulnerabilities of the Hunter were 
even more difficult to address and are discussed in the next section. 
b. Limitations and Vulnerabilities 
Design limitations of the Hunter UAV that affected operations during 
OAF were factors of endurance, range, and survivability.  The tactical range of the 
Hunter UAV was optimized for the support of advancing ground forces, not strike 
aircraft.  The use of the Hunter to support the air campaign via the CAOC exposed this 
limitation of the UAV.  The expected endurance of the Hunter UAV is 8-10 hours at a 
normal cruise speed of 90 knots.  Although this endurance is exceptional when compared 
to past tactical UAVs, it does not provide the lengthy coverage required for persistent 
ISR missions.  The time available to accomplish tasks inside the Kosovo engagement 
area were reduced further by the lengthy ingress and egress flight times required from 
Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia.  The mountainous terrain and line-of-sight 
communications requirements placed added limitations to the range of the UAV.  
Undesirable weather conditions created by the mountains increased the chances of 
experiencing turbulence, rain, and icing.  Icing and hazardous wind conditions caused TF 
Hunter to develop tailored TTPs to reduce the risk.  Operational flight altitudes that were 
often dictated to UAV operators required UAVs to pass through altitudes where icing 
conditions were common.  The slow climb rates of the Hunter also increased the time 
spent in icing conditions. 
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The survivability of the Hunter UAV during the Kosovo conflict was a 
constant concern due to in-flight vulnerabilities of the system.  Of the 21 UAV’s 
estimated lost during the war, eight of the losses were Hunter UAV’s, and of the eight 
lost, five of the losses were attributed to enemy fire.  The remaining two were lost to 
engine failure and operator error (Ripley, 1999, p. 5).  The flight characteristics of the 
Hunter make it particularly vulnerable to enemy fire because of a 15,000 MSL service 
ceiling and a max cruise speed of 110 knots.  The relatively low maximum takeoff gross 
weight of 1,600 pounds severely limits any ability to incorporate aircraft survivability 
equipment into the system.  This limitation in survivability combined with the slow speed 
of the UAV left the system exposed to Serbian man portable surface to air missiles 
(MANPADS).  Another favorite tactic of Serbian forces was using a Mi-8 HIP helicopter 
to fly up alongside the UAV and destroy it with machine gun fire.  This tactic was 
effective for a time until the Allied air campaign made significant efforts to counter 
Serbian helicopter operations with NATO strike fighters.  The allies eventually increased 
nighttime flying operations of UAVs in order to avoid further losses from Serb defenses.  
(p. 5) 
c. Innovative Integrations 
TF Hunter improved battlespace awareness and decision superiority by 
supplying real-time UAV imagery to the CAOC and integrating with TF Hawk to 
improve strike capabilities supporting the pursuit of precision engagement.  The real-time 
IMINT link integrated with the CAOC and other airborne assets expanded TF Hunter’s 
utilization in the war.  TF Hunter adapted to the new missions by developing innovative 
TTPs necessary to operate integrated laser-targeting systems, and execute in-flight re-
tasking that enhanced precision engagement concepts.  Laser target designators outfitted 
to the Hunter UAV supported and enhanced the mission of Apache helicopters assigned 
to TF Hawk.  This capability was refined during Kosovo, but never operationally 
executed before the war ended.  The support and coordination with TF Hawk to 
accomplish this mission was prepared and validated for operations inside Kosovo.  
Previous testing of this hunter-killer integration proved to enhance the situational 
awareness of the low flying Apache.  This integration allowed the Apache to increase its 
survivability by staying low in the terrain and still enabled the Apache to search for and 
acquire targets through UAV sensors.  This enabled the Apache to engage targets rapidly 
with minimal exposure to enemy fire, thus increasing survivability.  The Apache’s greater 
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capacity to search larger areas for targets with this hunter-killer combination validated 
this tactic for use in future engagements.  The only difficulty in accomplishing this TTP 
was providing the communication links required between the UAV operator and the 
Apache pilot.  The communication channels deemed necessary to coordinate laser 
designations and target acquisitions were not established at this point.  The quick fix in 
Kosovo for this problem was a relay through the EC-130E Airborne Battlefield 
Command, Control, and Communications (ABCCC) platform.  Another option was to 
equip a second UAV to fly a relay mission with an FM radio retransmission package.  
(Nascimento, 2000, p. 13) 
The hunter-killer concept was pursued further by an advanced concept 
technology demonstration (ACTD) called the Hunter standoff killer team (HSKT) and 
was used to refine TTPs and integrate the systems involved.  The goal of the HSKT 
initiative is to enhance the supported commander’s situational awareness and ability to 
command and control in the joint/coalition environment, enhance aircrew survivability 
and situational awareness, and greatly increase the lethality of the integration (Wright & 
Kuck, 2001, pp. 1-3).  The HSKT has enhanced our ability to achieve decision superiority 
by providing a capability to react rapidly to enemy movements. 
Another innovative development during TF Hunter was included in the 
concept of dynamic re-tasking used to check up on suspicious activity or update target 
areas.  The new capability to disseminate real-time imagery among many different users 
made re-tasking the Hunter UAVs a highly sought after commodity by commanders.  The 
obvious drawback to this newly discovered capability in attempting real-time battlespace 
awareness was that many times the re-tasking would yield insignificant results or 
increased loiter times over uncertain targets, and exposing the UAVs to increased 
opportunities for enemy fire (Nascimento, 2000, pp. 12-13).  Dynamic re-tasking was a 
first attempt at time-critical targeting that revealed new challenges to utilizing UAVs in 
this manner.  Growing acceptance for using UAVs to support this concept was an 




2. Predator UAV Employment 
Kosovo was the first combat operation for the USAF’s RQ-1 Predator medium 
endurance UAV, deploying only 19 months after the program initiated in 1996.  The 
speedy development and acquisition of the Predator is the result of the ACTD process 
that promotes advanced technology to meet immediate combat requirements.  The initial 
mission of the Predator was to fill the reconnaissance and surveillance role during OAF.  
The Predator is able to stay airborne for up to 40 hours and has a maximum altitude of 
25,000 feet.  Tusla Air Base in Bosnia became home for Predator operations supporting 
OAF.  The Predator had earlier deployments to Yugoslavia in 1995 before the Air Force 
accepted the system.  A DoD detachment under US Army administrative control, using 
code-name Nomad Vigil, deployed the Predator during the summer of 1995 to support 
US forces over Bosnia.  These operations supported JTF Provide Promise and came 
under the operational control of the CAOC in Vicenza, Italy.  The Predator supported 
Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Joint Endeavor through 1996 before returning 
to the US.  The USAF accepted the Predator in April 1996 and activated two squadrons, 
the 11th and 15th reconnaissance squadron (ets-news, 2002).  However, when OAF 
started in March 1999, there were not any Predators deployed in theater.  The Air Force 
quickly deployed the 11th RS to Tusla, AB to begin supporting air operations. 
a. Mission and Operations 
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The surveillance and reconnaissance mission of the Predator UAV during 
OAF was very significant due to the real-time imagery capabilities of its sensors.  The 
mission of the Predator was to assist in target acquisition and battle damage assessments 
(BDA) in theater.  The sensors of the Predator also enhanced precision-guided munitions 
and increased the speed of time-critical strikes.  Time-critical targeting was a major 
advancement in the employment of Predator operations and widely supported the 
advancement of precision engagement.  Towards the end of the war, the USAF rushed to 
equip the Predator with laser designators used to engage laser-guided munitions on 
targets.  This concept instigated suggested the plausibility of arming the Predator with 
Hellfire missiles.  The opportunity to employ the Hellfire missile tactic ended abruptly 
with the end of the war.  The next opportunity did not appear until its debut in 
Afghanistan.  The results of this new capability will be reviewed in the next case study. 
The imagery gathered by the Predator and relayed to the CAOC via Ku-
Band satellite communications provided a high bandwidth transfer rate permitting a 
stream of real-time video.  Predator imagery was disseminated across the JBS to a 
multitude of customers.  Many senior officials viewed the role of the Predator during 
OAF as an innovative move opening up new opportunities in targeting.  General John 
Jumper’s comments at the beginning of this chapter reflect the innovative TTPs that 
resulted from the employment of the Predator during OAF.  The Predator was the only 
UAV that remained solely under the control of Senior USAF leadership in the CAOC for 
the duration of the war.  The new missions of Predator helped to advance the concepts of 
real-time battlespace awareness, and made clear some of the advantages to achieving 
decision superiority. 
b. Limitations and Vulnerabilities 
Serb forces knew of NATO’s extensive use of UAVs during the 1994 
Bosnia crisis and were prepared to counter UAV use in Kosovo.  During OAF, the USAF 
lost two Predators to hostile actions and one that was non-combat related.  The Predator 
had to fly lower at times to complete mission requirements due to the limitations of UAV 
imagery resolution and the nature of imagery requested.  Following some targeting 
mistakes that led to civilian deaths (the inadvertent destruction of a bus and a tractor), 
NATO applied stringent rules of engagement (ROE) on target engagements (Ripley, 
1999, p. 3).  Target verification required at least two sources, and could include either the 
use of UAV real-time video or an Airborne Forward Air Controller (AFAC).  This ROE 
slowed down the rate of destroying Serb equipment and frustrated many NATO pilots.  A 
contributing factor to the slow target engagements was the 90-knot cruise speed of the 
Predator that limited how fast the UAV could travel to requested targets.  This delayed 
target verification and frustrated the ability to strike time-critical targets (p. 4).  Another 
limitation of the Predator UAV, as mentioned earlier, was the icing conditions that make 
Predator operations hazardous, leading to a reluctance to fly the Predator during the 
winter months. 
c. Integration Possibilities 
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The Predator UAV improved the targeting process during OAF by 
providing persistence over the battlespace that increased our ability to engage targets with 
precision-guided munitions.  The need for precision targeting in the engagement of time-
critical targets was a sought after capability during the air war.  The Predator was able to 
assist in improving the accuracy of time-critical targeting through a process called 
“georeferencing tactical imagery.”  The National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) 
maintains a database known as the Digital Point Position Database (DPPDB) and uses it 
to improve UAV tactical imagery through a georeferenced database called the Controlled 
Reference Image Base (CRIB).  The CRIB is a database developed by the Naval Air 
Warfare Center Weapons Division.  (Koch, 2000, p. 3)  The CRIB converts raw tactical 
UAV imagery into extremely precise targeting information supplied to the tactical user, 
then used to deliver precision-guided munitions.  Georeferencing synthesizes the 
resolution of satellite imagery, the timeliness of UAV tactical imagery, and the accuracy 
of the DPPDB to create extremely accurate location targeting information for time critical 
strikes (p. 3).  Targeting accuracy was a prime concern during the Kosovo air campaign 
and made the Predator imagery from its electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras and 
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) extremely valuable.  The process of georeferencing 
combined with the real-time sensor feeds of the Predator improved the identification of 
targets and the accuracy of precision engagements.  Utilizing the CRIB in targeting 
analysis helped promote the integration of UAV imagery into the time-critical strike 
process.  The Kosovo campaign developed the need to make better use of Predator 
imagery and prompted the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) to develop the 
Tactical Fusion Prototype (TFP) to facilitate the integration UAV imagery into the CRIB 
(p. 7).  The TFP overlays the CRIB database with the UAV video to correlate exact 
targeting information for strike planners.  This process occurs in a matter of minutes, and 
can be relayed to strike aircraft for use in improving the accuracy of hitting time-critical 
targets.  The Joint Targeting Workstations (JTW) utilizes the CRIB data to produce target 
verification data through collaboration with other reconnaissance platforms such as the 
U-2, and then forward the product to the CAOC for immediate targeting.  The CAOC 
exploited this process heavily in Kosovo by combining it with constantly running Target 
Package Generator Software, which allowed the CAOC to build strike packages on 
demand, and then transmit them to airborne fighters (p. 7).  The Predator imagery 
enhanced the ability to strike time-critical targets by relaying real-time battlespace 
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awareness of moving targets that enhanced the ability to accelerate the sensor-to-shooter 
decision loop that is crucial to precision engagement strategies. 
Initial actions for weaponizing UAV’s took place towards the end of the 
Kosovo air campaign by incorporating laser guidance systems on the Predator to assist in 
rapid targeting.  This created the capability to hit designated targets verified by the 
Predator with laser-guided munitions launched by manned strike aircraft (Lambeth, 2001, 
p. 95).  The relevancy of pursuing concepts of UAV weaponization were also made clear 
with the hunter-killer integration of the Apache and the Hunter UAV during TF Hawk 
operations.  These actions reflected the beginning of weaponizing UAV’s, and as we will 
see in the next chapter lead to the first successful delivery of a Hellfire missile by a 
Predator UAV in combat. 
C. CONCLUSION  
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The UAVs deployed during OAF expanded precision engagement by aiding in 
time-critical targeting, instantaneous battle damage assessments, and disseminating real-
time imagery.  New TTPs developed to perform dynamic re-tasking, operate in poor 
weather, and integrate hunter-killer packages between manned and unmanned platforms 
advanced the systematic integration of UAVs into the deep battlespace.  The most 
relevant advancement for TF Hunter was the utilization of the JBS to proliferate UAV 
imagery to all the potential users of the product.  The UAV imagery increased real-time 
ISR access and gave the CAOC the information advantage over Serbian troop 
movements.  The Predator was able to increase the accuracy and effectiveness of rapid 
targeting through the real-time imagery integrated with satellite communications and 
other national assets.  Access to the JBS allowed for the dissemination of Predator 
imagery to multiple users and promoted the integration of its resources.  The accuracy of 
targeting that resulted from UAV imagery and georeferencing techniques significantly 
improved NATO’s ability to reduce, but not eliminate, collateral damage.  Limitations in 
the flight performance and payloads of the UAV’s involved in Kosovo often caused some 
frustration in target analysis and some delays in time-critical strikes.  The relatively slow 
flight of UAVs restricted immediate feedback of some target verification requests.  The 
rules of engagement established by NATO precipitated many of the delays due to an over 
reliance on UAV imagery to confirm targets.  This review of Kosovo UAV operations 
highlights the acceleration of UAV technology that is certain to grow as the capabilities 
in speed, imaging resolution, and survivability increase in the coming years.  The 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2000-2025 produced by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense establishes a strong case for the increased capabilities of UAVs of the future 
because of improvements in processing power, propulsion, communications, and 
payloads.  The UAV Roadmap is reviewed briefly in the final chapter of this study. 
Other integration issues addressed briefly for the first time in Kosovo was the 
integration of manned and unmanned flight within the same airspace or terminal airfield.  
The unique airspace restrictions within Kosovo enhanced UAVs’ ability to operate in 
theater with minimal impact on manned flight operations.  This will not always be the 
case in future conflicts and actions to further address the issue of UAVs operating near 
manned flight operations must be undertaken.  One last issue strongly prevalent 
throughout OAF was the incompatibility between NATO allied UAVs and US systems 
that supplied real-time imagery.  The British were continually frustrated with attempts to 
integrate Phoenix UAV imagery with the CAOC due to incompatibilities in data link 
communications that restricted any wide distribution.  Methods for disseminating 
Phoenix imagery were solved towards the end of the war, but were not fully implemented 
in time.  The future of coalition warfare makes allied interoperability a major concern.  
Only by addressing a standardized communication system will procedures for future 
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III. AFGHANISTAN UAV EMPLOYMENT 
There have been battles fought in Afghanistan for centuries, and I 
don’t think any of them have seen the speed, results, and the speed of 
effect that we have here.  Clearly something different is going on.  Retired 
Navy Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, DoD Director for Transformation 
(Bender, Burger, & Koch, 2001, p. 18)  
One [lesson] is the value of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).  
Second I would [highlight] the connection between UAV’s, combat 
aircraft and bombers, and the people on the ground and the value that is 
created by those connections and the use of smart munitions.  That creates 
a powerful effect.  Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld (Federal 
Department and Agency Documents, 2001) 
A. BACKGROUND 
This analysis of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) will highlight how rapidly 
evolving capabilities in UAV systems are enhancing precision engagement strategies and 
increasing our information advantage.  Real-time UAV systems are changing the speed at 
which we can strike moving targets by reducing the decision time necessary to complete 
the sensor-to-shooter decision loop.  Increased battlespace awareness capable with 
persistent ISR sensors on UAV systems has increased our real-time situational awareness 
of the enemy movements.  The dynamics of precision engagement creates devastating 
effects on the enemy’s ability to respond or effectively make decisions.  This case study 
will concentrate on the integration of UAV system capabilities that increased our ability 
to maintain information superiority and exploit our real-time situational awareness. 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, the 
commitment to strike back at the Al Qaeda Network, and topple the Taliban leadership 
governing Afghanistan was extremely high.  The US initiated military action on October 
7, 2001 with air strikes on Taliban military targets and the country’s sparse air defenses.  
The initial air strikes prepared the battlespace for the next phase and demonstrated the 
global reach of US strategic forces.  The next phase was one of the most significant 
military developments during OEF by infiltrating little over 300 Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) and intelligence personnel on the ground.  The first insertion of Special 
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Forces A-teams was on October 19, 2001 and just 49 days later, the Taliban government 
fell in the southern city of Kandahar on December 6, 2001. 
The primary mission of the Special Forces on the ground in Afghanistan was 
threefold.  First, they were to synchronize the unorganized forces of ethnic Uzbek and 
Tajik opposition groups in the north represented by the Northern Alliance.  Second, they 
were to build small armies out of the Pushtun tribesmen in the south.  Third, they were to 
create the critical linkage to provide targeting information to joint strike aircraft 
delivering precision guided weapons (Priest, 2002, p. 1A).  This third mission of SOF 
proved to be very effective in rolling back the Taliban forces.  The vital relationships 
forged between SOF forces and indigenous Afghan opposition to Taliban rule contributed 
to our ability to strike with certainty at the heart of Taliban front lines.  A recently 
published interview with Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. Jumper highlights the 
effectiveness of the relationships forged by Special Forces when integrated with precision 
engagement. 
We witness transformation when we see airmen traveling by 
horseback with the tools of their trade (GPS and laser range finders) 
hanging from a saddle.  With secure satellite and radio links, they pass 
target coordinates to bombers or fighters from the Air Force, Navy, or 
Marines flying miles overhead.  We see the venerable 40-year old B-52 
precisely place a JDAM just 800 meters from our friendly positions.  No 
single piece of this equation is transformational but together it yields a 
transformational asymmetrical advantage over any enemy.  General John 
P. Jumper, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (“Force transformer”, 2002, 1, 2, 
p. 28) 
The effective targeting skills provided by SOF improved the sensor-to-shooter 
decision loop immensely.  SOF utilized techniques such as laser targeting designators, 
and the supply of accurate GPS coordinates to direct precision-guided munitions on 
Taliban positions.  These techniques of targeting allowed US forces to shift their 
targeting from strategic fixed sites to mobile Taliban forces.  The tremendous swing in 
momentum in favor of the Northern Alliance was immediately evident with the rapid 
advancement of forces around Mazar-e Sharif, and later into Northern Kabul.  SOF teams 
on the ground became the supported force that enabled the on-call demand of precision-
guided munitions. 
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The persistent coverage of real-time imagery provided through UAV sensors was 
effectively combined with the ground truth supplied by SOF and intelligence personnel to 
dramatically improve the information advantage over enemy forces in Afghanistan.  US 
forces closely monitored the movement of Taliban and Al Qaida forces on the ground 
while the persistent use of sensors onboard the Predator RQ-1 and Global Hawk RQ-4 
UAV monitored the enemy from the air.  The movements of Taliban forces were easily 
traceable and countered swiftly through the common operating picture developed through 
integrated systems.  Instantaneous battle damage assessments following an attack 
increased the certainty of achieving desired results on the enemy and validated the need 
for any necessary follow-on strikes.  The synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro 
optical/infra-red (EO/IR) cameras aboard Predator and Global Hawk UAVs were capable 
of providing real-time imagery and precision coordinates over broadband data-links that 
streamed video imagery to a multitude of users.  The remainder of this chapter reviews 
the integration of the Predator and Global Hawk into an improved sensor-to-shooter 
decision cycle that effectively increased our precision engagement capabilities.  The 
analysis of each UAV system will cover the mission integration, operations, 
vulnerabilities, and limitations that confronted each system during combat operations. 
B. PREDATOR UAV HUNTER/KILLER INTEGRATION 
Predator use in Afghanistan expanded past the role of ISR to the next phase of 
military operations: the capability observe, track, and autonomously strike at targets with 
precision and deadly accuracy.  In February 2001, the first test of a Hellfire missile from 
a Predator proved very successful.  The tests succeeded in destroying targets 12 out of 16 
times.  Being able to wield this capability from a standoff distance, persistently monitor 
the target, precisely strike, and report instantaneous BDA closed the sensor-to-shooter 
loop to a matter of minutes.  The CIA therefore embraced this capability during OEF by 
targeting Taliban convoys, SUVs, and tunnel complexes in the hopes of removing Al 
Qaeda or Taliban leadership.  CIA Predators launched several attacks on 4-5 February 
2002 in the Zhawar Killi region of eastern Afghanistan on suspected Al Qaeda tunnel 
complexes with this objective in mind (Samson, 2002, p. 1).  This type of attack prior to 
UAV weaponization would have required extremely long flight hours of manned fighter 
aircraft, extensive space systems, and manned surveillance capabilities.  The Predator 
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provides continuous coverage for these operations that would have been resource 
intensive for manned systems to accomplish.  The long endurance hours of the Predator 
and the ability to operate sensors from a standoff distance allows for the persistent 
observation of targets until the appropriate moment to strike with the greatest effect 
presents itself.  This capability provided an information advantage over the enemy that 
was virtually impossible for Taliban forces to counter.  SOF ground forces and 
intelligence personnel trained to operate in the austere and remote environments provided 
the necessary ground truth to increase the certainty of our attacks and strike at mobile 
targets.  The appropriate linkage in surveillance capabilities on the ground remains a 
critical contributor to properly identifying mobile targets.  Kosovo demonstrated how 
difficult target verification could be without some reliance on ground forces to locate and 
distinguish certain types of mobile targets. 
1. Mission and Operations 
The Predator was prepared to execute targeting techniques developed at the close 
of OAF at the beginning of OEF.  TTPs in laser targeting and target verification were 
established and ready for combat operations within the established USAF squadrons.  
The Predator guided strike aircraft to mobile targets, and then highlighted target with 
laser designators.  The early shift in the UAV intelligence paradigm from purely ISR 
missions to include targeting was beginning to take hold.  The director of the Pentagon’s 
ISR systems, Kevin Meiners, commented about the changes resulting from OEF.  “The 
big thing we’re finding out in Afghanistan is that ISR is all about targeting.”  Intelligence 
once routed back to the analysts for targeting purposes can now be redirected to combat 
aircraft for immediate engagements (Fulgham, December 2001, p. 4).  Predator 
operations in OEF pursued precision engagement by shortening the sensor-to-shooter 
decision cycle to a matter of minutes and provided the ability to strike time-critical 
targets that earlier would have been lost to the fog of war.  The loitering capabilities of 
UAV systems over and around dangerous targets, deemed too risky for manned aircraft, 
provided the means to set up a surveillance capability well in advance of attacks, then 
observe the results and actions of the enemy immediately following the attack.  This 
capability fully encompasses the desirable effects of precision engagement.  These tactics 
used with great effect in Afghanistan capitalized on the Predator’s ability to remain 
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airborne for up to 40 hours at distances of up to 500 nautical miles.  The following 
vignette exemplifies this point. 
The drone pinpointed the house where a group of senior al Qaeda 
officials, including Muhammad Atef, had gathered and relayed live video 
pictures of the scene to CIA and military officials, who called in strikes 
from a Navy F/A-18 fighter-bomber.  As people fled the building, the 
Predator opened fire on them with Hellfire missiles.  Finally, it circled 
over the area, assessing the damage.  (Miller, & Schmitt, 2001, p. B1) 
Afghanistan operations have catalyzed the discovery of innovative targeting 
techniques by utilizing Predator real-time video feeds and laser target designators.  The 
most recent integration effecting precision engagement is the incorporation of Predator 
video feed directly to the AC-130U Spectre gunship.  The AC-130 provides close air 
support and firepower to Special Forces via an extensive sensor package of its own that 
accurately directs the firepower of its three computer controlled guns; a 40mm gun, a 
105-mm howitzer cannon, and a fully automatic 25mm Gatling gun (Goodman, 2001, 
p.2).  The Predator establishes a direct data-link to the AC-130 thus providing 
surveillance video imagery and synthetic aperture radar data that can be used for target 
acquisition and real-time situational awareness.  This data-link allows the gunship to 
monitor targets outside their general location and receive preliminary target acquisition 
data prior to arriving on scene.  This capability expedites the active engagement of targets 
immediately upon arrival.  General Jumper lauded this targeting enhancement as one of 
the most innovative targeting tactics developed over the course of the war.  (Bender, 
Burger, & Koch, 2001, p. 20) 
2. Limitations and Vulnerabilities 
One of the major drawbacks of the Predator in Afghanistan was vulnerability to 
inclement weather, as was the case in Kosovo.  The rugged mountains of Afghanistan can 
produce the same hazardous weather conditions experienced in the Kosovo region, such 
as icing and mountain wave turbulence.  Prior to OEF, an estimated 19 Predators were 
lost to either poor performance in inclement weather or during critical phases of flight 
such as landings.  This has resulted in nearly a third of the initial USAF fleet lost to non-
combat related conditions (The active USAF inventory of Predators before the 9/11 
attacks totaled 60 UAV’s).  As of February 2002, three Predators have been lost in 
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Afghanistan due to poor weather performance (Samson, 2002, p. 1).  The relatively 
benign combat threat to Predators in Afghanistan has protected the UAV from hostile 
fire, but this has only highlighted the vulnerability of the Predator to weather conditions.  
Eventually, more responsive flight control surfaces and adequate deicing systems planned 
for next generation UAVs should help alleviate this vulnerability.  The next generation 
Predator-B has already improved flight characteristics with increased propulsion in the 
form of a turboprop engine that allows it to fly higher, faster, and carry a larger payload 
than its baseline predecessor.  The 45,000 feet cruise altitude of the Predator-B, compared 
to the previous 25,000 feet ceiling of the baseline Predator, will remove the Predator-B 
from the poor weather conditions often associated with altitudes below 25,000 feet.  
Although the higher altitudes will diminish the resolution of the current sensors on the 
baseline Predator, the improved propulsion and increased payload of the Predator-B will 
allow it to carry larger sensors that will change the capabilities over the baseline Predator 
significantly.  In addition, the higher altitude capability of the Predator-B cannot replace 
the current mission of the baseline Predator firing the Hellfire missile due to necessary 
targeting parameters only met from lower altitudes.  The baseline Predator normally 
deploys at altitudes between 15,000 and 25,000 feet that optimize real-time video feeds to 
command elements and other platforms.  The increased performance of the Predator-B 
does not mean that it cannot be weaponized; only that it’s not beneficial to arm it with the 
Hellfire missile.  Other weapons under consideration include GPS-guided munitions such 
as the 250-pound Small Diameter Bomb currently being developed by the Air Force 
(Wall, 2002, January 2, p. 3). 
3. Integration Possibilities 
The opportunities to integrate the Predator are coming forward at a rapid pace.  
The use of Predator real-time video feeds by the AC-130 Gunship is an example of how 
the benefits of UAV systems, integrated with other weapon systems, produce effective 
capabilities congruent with precision engagement.  The hunter-killer combination 
represented by Predator and the AC-130 fills a long-standing requirement for SOF to 
increase real-time access to intelligence gathering assets deemed necessary to support 
time-critical strikes often necessary to support special operations.  Interest has already 
grown within SOCOM and the Pentagon to provide SOF with its own operational 
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Predator fleet. (Wall, 2002, April 29, p. 80).  The ability of the Predator to carry 
communications packages is another viable mission for UAV systems, and would help 
overcome the tactical level limitations in coverage often experienced by SOF in the past.  
Another beneficial use of the Predator immensely benefiting precision engagement is 
using the system as a poor man’s GPS satellite in areas of reduced satellite coverage 
(UAV roadmap, 2000, p. A-14). 
C. GLOBAL HAWK ISR INTEGRATION 
The strategic bombing campaign of Afghanistan initially required advanced ISR 
capabilities over the battlespace.  Advanced space-based ISR systems and manned U-2 
aircraft supported this initial requirement, but as the war progressed, time-critical 
targeting became an issue, and the need for additional ISR capabilities increased.  The 
acceleration of Global Hawk to operational status through the increased efforts of the 
ACTD made Global Hawk available as an alternate ISR platform to integrate into the war 
as soon as possible.  Out of the five Global Hawks that were operational at the start of the 
war, three deployed to the theater by early November (Fulghum & Wall, 2001, p. 3).  The 
immediate mission of Global Hawk in Afghanistan was to extend the capabilities 
traditionally provided by the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.  A combination of the manned 
and unmanned systems assured nearly unbroken coverage for operations that provided 
persistent real-time coverage of the battlespace.  The two ISR systems forward deployed 
together at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates (Weinberger, 2002, p. 1). 
1. Mission and Operations 
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The Global Hawk has a cruise altitude of 65,000 feet and is capable of 40-hour 
flights that go well beyond the human factors limiting manned flight.  Global Hawk’s 
sensors are capable of surveillance ranges out to 100 nautical miles that allow it to 
network targeting data among other systems such as E-8C Joint Surveillance Target 
Attack Radar System (JSTARS).  The simultaneous deployment of Global Hawk and 
JSTARS reflects the synergistic targeting strategy supported by the two systems.  The 
ground surveillance radar carried by JSTARS provides surveillance capabilities of enemy 
territory out to 200 nautical miles.  This coverage allows JSTARS to direct Global Hawk 
operations within this umbrella manage the tracking of moving targets.  Global Hawk 
sensors include electro-optical/infra-red cameras combined with synthetic aperture radar 
capable of penetrating weather and performing nighttime operations.  Other payloads 
include SIGINT and ELINT sensors such as the LR-100 electronic intelligence-gathering 
system (Fulghum & Wall, 2001, p. 3).  The wide-angle coverage of Global Hawk and 
JSTARS combined provides a necessary ISR capability to direct strike aircraft.  The 
Global Hawk sensors have integrated the “sensor to shooter” decision cycle among a 
network of other systems to increase the speed of engaging time-critical targets.  The 
targeting data gathered by Global Hawk also coordinates information with Hellfire armed 
Predator UAVs, F-15E strike aircraft, and strategic bombers.  Global Hawk target 
tracking data and ISR information is also networked with the RC-135 Rivet Joint, Joint-
STARS, and AWACS aircraft to help provide a common operating picture (COP) of the 
battlespace (p. 4).  This COP effectively enables decision superiority for the airborne 
commander when properly synthesized.  UAV technological advancements made the 
combat debut of Global Hawk possible, and marked the beginning of an ability to provide 
continuous unbroken coverage.  This increased persistence over the battlespace is what 
UAV systems provide as an enabler for increasing the information advantage. 
2. Limitations and Vulnerabilities 
Contrary to what Global Hawk advocates would have us believe, the payload and 
sensors of this system do not yet surpass the capabilities of the long-standing U-2 
program.  The higher resolution and processing power of the U-2 payloads and sensors 
currently more than double that of Global Hawk capabilities.  This comparison is due to 
change in Global Hawk’s favor through advances in miniaturization of sensor 
components that will decrease payload requirements.  Global Hawk has already 
incorporated the U-2 sensor processing software to improve imagery resolution.  Due to 
the importance placed on Global Hawk, Raytheon, the company that designs the sensor 
suite for the UAV, has accelerated the full integration of all the sensors to include electro-
optical/infra-red cameras, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic intelligence payloads. 
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The current successes of Global Hawk are reaping rewards in the budgeting 
process as well.  FY03 Budget has nearly 630 million dollars slated for the production of 
three more Global Hawk aircraft, and is due to accelerate improvements in electronics 
and sensors.  The Air Force is also projecting the purchase of up to six Global Hawks in 
2004 (Wall, 2002, January 2, p. 4).  The current limited inventory of Global Hawk’s 
represents a problem if the UAV were to experience high combat losses.  The limited 
number of Global Hawk UAV’s is a temporary result of the accelerated operational 
deployment schedule so soon after USAF acquisition.  Concerns mounted over this 
limitation when on December 30, 2001 a Global Hawk crashed while it was returning to 
UAE following a mission in Afghanistan.  The accident investigation discovered that the 
cause of the crash was the failure of a rod that moved the control surface of the V-tail.  
The culprit was the improper installation of a bolt securing the rod during the 
manufacturing process.  (Nordwall, 2002, p. 29)  The USAF is also addressing the current 
limitation represented by Global Hawk’s payload capacity.  The current payload of 2,000 
pounds is soon to increase to 3,000 pounds due to a recently awarded contract to 
Northrop-Grumman. (Morris, 2002, p. 2).  The upgrade in payload will help Global 
Hawk carry an increased number of interchangeable sensor suites.  The challenge set 
forth to Northrop-Grumman will be to increase the payload without decreasing the USAF 
requirement of 24 hours on station at 65,000 feet. 
3. Integration Possibilities 
The biggest future boost that Global Hawk will give to the time-critical targeting 
effort is through the Network-Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) program, which is 
part of the newest round of ACTDs.  The NCCT promotes the synergistic integration of 
intelligence platforms to improve the capability to detect, identify, and locate time-
critical moving targets.  Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Precision 
Engagement, Judith Daly, stated the objective of the NCCT is to build networks linking 
platforms to meet the timeline requirements of air-launched weapons.  The multitude of 
aircraft integrated into the NCCT include the RC-135 Rivet Joint, E-8 Joint STARS, E-3 
AWACS, Global Hawk, Predator, U-2, Army Guardrail, Navy EP-3E and the Royal Air 
Force Nimrod and Astor.  The NCCT will promote the linkage and overlay of numerous 
signals intelligence sources, producing a quick source of locating time-critical targets.  
The NCCT ACTD, which will reach completion in 2005, is sponsored by CENTCOM.  
(Fulghum & Wall, 2001, p. 6)  The Pentagon and DARPA are pursuing programs to 
improve Global Hawk radar with foliage penetration synthetic aperture radar, and a 
multiplatform radar technology insertion program (MP-RTIP).  The radar enhancement 
will permit the ability to track moving ground targets even when obscured by tree cover.  
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The MP-RTIP will improve Global Hawk radar ground tracking capabilities beyond the 
current limitation of Joint STARS radar by improving the accuracy and increasing the 
number of targets tracked simultaneously (Wall, 2002, April 29, p. 81).  These 
investments in Global Hawk greatly enhance the network-centric integration of the UAVs 
and guarantee the viability of UAV’s in the future. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The synergistic effect of new targeting techniques and advanced UAV capabilities 
has promoted the ability to exploit information superiority in a manner that questions 
many of the old paradigms set by conventional doctrine.  Arming UAV’s and extending 
the duration and capabilities of UAV sensors has forced the hand of stovepipe systems by 
rapidly integrating C4ISR processes that promote striking the enemy at the earliest 
detection.  Achieving real-time situational awareness came closer to reality during OEF 
due to advanced capabilities of Global Hawk.  A significant factor contributing to the 
success of Operation Enduring Freedom in comparison to Operation Allied Force was the 
employment of SOF ground forces in a manner that increased our precision engagement 
effectiveness.  The human sensors represented by SOF were a necessity that enhanced 
our real-time situational awareness and improved our precision engagement strategies.  
The critical links attainable only through the presence of SOF on the ground produced 
measurable results with the effective targeting networks created.  ISR platforms such as 
Global Hawk and Predator have allowed for time-critical targeting techniques that have 
contributed to closing the gap between the sensor and shooter in innovative ways.  The 
contributions of real-time imagery enhancements provided to AC-130 aircrews, the 
hellfire engagements of Predator, and the strategic coverage of Global Hawk, have all 
greatly enhanced precision engagement. 
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IV. UAV PATHWAYS FOR PRECISION ENGAGEMENT 
Integral to the effectiveness of any technology is our ability to 
harness the synergy of multiple systems.  To that end, the Air Force is 
pursuing the seamless integration of manned, unmanned, and space assets.  
General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (“Force 
transformer,” 2002, p. 26) 
Afghanistan operations acted as a catalyst for accelerating a transformation in 
today’s joint force.  Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems are quickly becoming a 
cornerstone for transformational change by networking advanced information 
technology.  The information advantage created by real-time data links has developed a 
new paradigm for precision engagement.  Networked information systems are achieving 
information superiority over the battlespace by providing access to real-time intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities used to close the gap between the 
sensor and the shooter.  This new persistence over the battlespace provided by today’s 
UAV systems is unprecedented compared to past combat ISR capabilities.  The increased 
availability of real-time ISR to command and control (C2) nodes, weapon systems, and 
now ground forces has improved our situational awareness and access to precise 
information necessary to achieve the informational advantage that makes precision 
engagement possible. 
Advances in UAV technology are filling the gaps necessary to integrate 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.  UAVs will continue to improve precision engagement 
through technological advances in propulsion, sensors, processing power, 
communications, and munitions.  Real-time data links supplying imagery, signal, and 
electronic intelligence are providing the conduit for faster decision cycles in support of 
the time-critical targeting goals involved in precision engagement.  Improved UAV 
imagery and radar continues to enhance the accuracy and speedy delivery of precise 
information from digital databases such as the Controlled Reference Image Base (CRIB) 
to precision-guided weapons. 
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Advancements in electronics and computers are steadily increasing the 
bandwidths and processing power of information systems that are greatly improving 
UAV capabilities.  The importance of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations 
(ACTD) administered by the Department of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, has had a positive impact by accelerating the operational fielding of advanced 
technology.  Improvements in Predator UAV capabilities, and the speedy acquisition of 
Global Hawk were only two of many ACTD contributions advancing UAV technology.  
Other ACTD programs such as Network-Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) are 
promoting the integration of RC-135 Rivet Joint, E-8 Joint STARS, E-3 AWACS, RQ-4 
Global Hawk, RQ-1 Predator, U-2, Army Guardrail, Navy EP-3E, and the Royal Air 
Force Nimrod and Astor, representing the necessary joint-combined and interoperable 
information networks required to execute precision engagement.  The combined effects 
of UAV technological improvements in real-time capabilities continue to expand these 
networks by making large contributions to maintaining the information superiority that 
makes precision engagement possible. 
A. THE FUTURE OF UAV TECHNOLOGY 
Projected technological advancements over the next 25 years will steadily 
increase the contribution of UAVs to information superiority and precision engagement.  
Michael O’Hanlon (2000) reviewed several technological areas representing the best 
modernization opportunities to enhance future U.S. military capabilities discussed in 
JV2020.  He recommends pursuing a strategy that encompasses the system-of-systems 
approach that capitalizes on projected advances in electronics and computers (O’Hanlon, 
2000, p. 172).  O’Hanlon concluded that the projected advancements in these areas would 
be pivotal in increasing the importance of two technologies critical to the system-of-
systems approach: precision-guided munitions, and the information networks that control 
sensors and communications systems (p. 173).  This thesis has just demonstrated through 
its case studies that these are the exact categories where UAV technology has contributed 
the most.  Joint forces have just begun to realize the enabling effects of advanced UAV 
technology on precision engagement concepts, and how the missions of UAVs are 
expanding to exploit the information advantage gained through persistent real-time 
capabilities. 
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Another document that shows the importance of future UAV technology is the 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2000-2025.  Prepared by the staffs of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for C3I, this document reviews technological areas that will 
advance UAV missions and capabilities.  It also estimates UAVs could meet forty per 
cent of the 146 shortfalls identified by the Unified Commands’ 1999 Integrated Priority 
List (IPL) (“The UAV Roadmap”, 2001, p. 13).  The Roadmap categorized UAV related 
mission into 15 areas.  The fifteen were command, control, and communications; 
weapons of mass destruction counterproliferation, combat search and rescue, time critical 
targeting; mine countermeasures; meteorology; psychological operations; signal 
intelligence; electronic intelligence; suppression of enemy air defenses; theater-air 
missile defense; force protection; and imagery intelligence.  For the Unified Commanders 
to completely accept UAV systems to accomplish these missions, some improvements in 
survivability and processing power must occur.  The survivability of UAV systems 
continues to grow with improvements in defensive systems, flight characteristics, and 
innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).  Increasing processing power will 
increase the ability of UAVs to create targeting information.  The effects of Moore’s Law 
will be the deciding factor in this arena.  Moore’s Law predicts the doubling of the 
currently available processing power every 12 to 18 months.  This would also aid in 
miniaturizing payloads, and allow the integration of increasingly capable processors to 
UAV sensors (“The UAV Roadmap”, p. 17).  The UAV roadmap does an excellent job 
combining the UAV missions identified by the Theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) 
and forecasts of emerging technologies that maximize future technological possibilities of 
UAVs.  A short summary of the significant capabilities projected over the next 25 years 
by the UAV roadmap highlights the many possible innovations affecting UAV precision 
engagement for the future. 
Improvements in the area of digital data transfer hinge upon a continued increase 
of the data transfer rates currently available.  Radiated Frequency (RF) systems are 
currently providing the needed improvements, but the demands for higher bandwidths 
will continue to rise.  Currently, the RF system of the Joint Tactical Information Display 
System (JTIDS), also called Link 16, provides the best capabilities to transfer digital data 
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across the battlespace.  The need to accommodate higher bandwidths continues to grow 
making optical systems such as laser communications very attractive.  Laser 
communications are capable of increasing the bandwidth by an order of magnitude of 
three over the best RF systems the future has to offer (“The UAV Roadmap”, p. 32).  
Currently, problems associated with pointing, acquiring, and tracking data-link signals 
remain obstacles to fielding laser communications reliable enough for military use (p. 
33).  Increased data transfer rates will drastically improve the sharing of real-time 
information over the battlespace and greatly improve the real-time capabilities of UAVs. 
Advances in propulsion translate directly to increased endurance for UAVs, and 
would offer dramatic increases to UAV persistence over the battlespace.  Thrust-to-
weight ratios are projected to increase up to 250% over next 15 years and will greatly 
improve the speed and agility of future UAVs (p. 18).  Fuel consumption improvements 
show the promise of increasing the current range and endurance limits enjoyed by high 
endurance UAVs like Global Hawk.  The incorporation of powerful fuel cells can also 
decrease audible noise levels, which significantly decrease the detectability of UAVs.  
This will enable future tactical UAVs to operate at lower altitudes, thus improving 
electronic and signal intelligence capabilities. 
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The continued improvements in sensor payload capacity of UAVs will improve 
the quality and quantity of information gathered over the battlespace.  Improved 
communications systems, enhanced by advances in miniaturization, will expand the C2 
mission of UAVs.  Innovative munitions represented by the 250-pound small diameter 
bomb, high power microwaves, or incendiary devices are being explored to arm next 
generation tactical UAVs and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV).  The effects of 
Moore’s law will advance the speed of sensor data processing related to imagery analysis 
and target acquisition that will directly affect the speed of shooter engagement decisions.  
Autonomous processing by UAVs will remove delays currently represented by the 
necessity to data link with ground-based systems or larger manned systems like JSTARS 
currently utilized to analyze the sensor imagery creating the targeting data.  This will 
have real-time implications on the ability of UAVs to engage time-critical targets.  
Researchers expect the limits of silicon-based microprocessors to be reached by 2010-15.  
At that time, silicon will no longer be the standard medium for processors.  Research 
conducted to find an element to replace silicon-based microprocessors has resulted in 
alternative mediums such as gallium arsenide “microcube” technology that might 
possibly allow for enough processing power to provide an autonomous processing UAV 
capability (pp. 35-36). 
In summary, the reduced acoustic signatures provided by improvements in 
propulsion systems, increased sensor and payload capabilities from improved processing 
power, and increased data-transfer rates will all improve the autonomous operations of 
UAVs, increasing their support for precision engagement strategies.  Sensor 
improvements will reduce the need to fly in the threat envelopes of most surface-to-air 
missiles and therefore increase the survivability.  The projected major breakthroughs in 
propulsion systems, sensor capabilities, and autonomous operations within the next 25 
years, will correct the survivability issues raised in the two case studies.  UAV 
importance to precision engagement will increase proportionally with increased 
survivability by decreasing the reluctance of commanders to use UAVs for fear of 
depleting their number. 
B. UAV IMPLICATIONS FOR SOF 
We are witness to the true potential of transformation.  It can be 
seen in stories from current operations.  Despite being out-numbered, 
outgunned, and deep within enemy territory, US Air Force Combat 
Controllers, serving as part of Special Operations Forces (SOF) insertion 
teams, are serving with distinction using transformational technologies, 
transformational tactics and joint processes.  General John P. Jumper, 
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (“Force transformer,” 2002, p. 28) 
By providing real-time data links and persistent ISR capabilities, UAV systems 
would benefit SOF, particularly in the areas of extending situational awareness and 
increasing the information advantage.  The integration of Predator UAV and AC-130U 
gunship operations is an excellent example of this.  The combined effect of both has 
enhanced the survivability of the gunship while simultaneously increasing the speed of 
engagements, once again closing the gap between the sensor and shooter.  This added 
situational awareness has increased our information advantage, thus increasing our ability 
to achieve surprise by rapidly engaging the enemy upon detection.  USSOCOM is 
exploring ways in which UAVs might accelerate the full potential envisioned by 
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precision engagement concepts.  SOFs historical reliance on technological superiority 
suggests that they should be a test bed for increasing UAV systems integration.  Special 
Forces are traditionally the “first in and last out” in a conflict, which makes the rapid 
deployment and mission capabilities of UAV systems important to SOF.  The C4ISR 
capabilities of UAV technology will only strengthen the situational awareness of Special 
Forces in the field while combining with the ground truth obtained through SOF, an 
operational concept that was proven in Afghanistan.  The combination of SOF on the 
ground with real-time ISR capabilities of UAV systems enables an informational 
advantage, and increases our ability to engage the enemy with precision. 
The advent of smaller precision munitions highly capable of engaging multiple 
targets will greatly enhance the operational capabilities possible with UAV systems 
integrated with SOF.  Combined with projected increases in payload capacity and the 
extended endurance of UAVs, SOF will have a persistent capability over the battlespace 
that provides the necessary means to instantaneously respond when supporting direct 
action missions.  Advances in time-critical targeting through network-centric warfare 
made clear throughout this thesis could enable SOF to coordinate direct action efforts 
with conventional forces using speed and accuracy never before possible.  UAV systems 
stand at the synapse of this process and every effort must be made by SOF to improve 
joint interoperability with this rapidly evolving capability. 
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